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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal ) 
corporation, ) BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) Case No. 880075-CA 
vs. ) Appeal Priority 2 
ARTIS BRENT BULLA, ) 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
AND APPELLATE AUTHORITY 
This is an appeal from a criminal conviction after a 
jury trial in the then Fifth Circuit Court (now Third 
Circuit Court) for Salt Lake City, the Honorable Michael 
Hutchings, Judge, presiding on the charges of running a red 
light and false information to a police officer. Authority 
for this appeal is provided in Section 78-2-3, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
I: Whether defendant Bulla established that his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated by 
Salt Lake City Police Officers investigation subsequent to a 
traffic violation. 
II. Whether there were any procedural errors requiring 
reversal. 
GOVERNING LAW 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
77-7-15 - Authority of peace officer to stop 
and question suspect -- grounds. A peace 
officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
77-35-19. Rule 19 -- Instructions. 
(a) At the close of the evidence or at such 
earlier time as the court reasonably direct, 
any party may file written request that the 
court instruct the jury on the law as set 
forth in the request. At the same time 
copies of such requests shall be furnished to 
the other parties. The court shall inform 
counsel of its proposed action upon the 
request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions, unless the 
parties stipulate that such instructions may 
be given orally, or otherwise waive this 
requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented 
and given, or refused, the court shall 
endorse its decision and shall initial or 
sign it. If part be given and part refused, 
the court shall distinguish, showing by the 
endorsement what part of the charge was given 
and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objected and the ground of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
(d) The Court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court refers 
to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the 
jury that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
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(e) Arguments of the respective parties 
shall be made after the court has instructed 
the jury. Unless otherwise provided by law, 
any limitation upon time for argument shall 
be within, the discreti on of the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE1 
Defendant Bulla was charged by i mil 1 ul an 
i nformation with violating Section 84 of the Traffic Cnde of 
^al* Lake *ity * jinawiiii iv running a red light while 
same ~m j.u.at** > v *;<.;. si m g Se^ i : ,i ..*-i ~i. Revised 
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, b^ j.iv; j i false name i_ a 
pciJ i ce c • I:f ::i c e r ( • ' •  • :":;: • • ' 
: a* tr rii> a.: i.^lows: 
• *
 ;
 .:s . ,'ie 20, 19R * . • 5-.--- 200 
So i ith * 
ridin . , r J .y : i * westbot it : ^ ^ - ..*r. approaching 
East. Sa. r Lake . *** Police ")ffi er IP -« * j ~ - *..tribe ,:vd on 
3 0 0 E (3 s 1 • a p i;> r*" » a c I' i i 11i j . M M ) ":. i *» 1111 I :i  i I 1 I ::i s n i a i: k e d p o ] i c e c a i:. 
Officer Guest, havi nq the green light: continued through the 
intersection, and looked over his shoulder. The officerTs 
I i i )ht wais >t j 1 1 i 11 I n in mi I Kin! • j l e fenda i i t ' s 1:1 l e r e f o i e r e d ) ai id 
-^ defendant proceeded pcii: tially thr oi igl i the intersection 
Defendant Bulla's Brief fails to comply with Rule 24 of 
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals by not citing at all 
to the record. Instead his entire brief is just a self-
serving recitation of his own testimony. Of course, on 
appeal, this Court must review the facts in the light most 
favorable to supporting the jury's verdict. Green v. Tri-0-
Inc, 667 P. 2d 1320 (Utah ^ 9 ^ . 
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westbound stopping only after seeing the police car. (T. 
54. ) 
2. Officer Guest stopped the defendant and "pointed 
out to him that he made a violation we needed to talk 
2 
about." (T. 54.) Officer Guest also indicated the 
defendant crossed in front of other southbound traffic after 
Officer Guest had passed. (T. 70.) 
3. Officer Guest asked the defendant for identifica-
tion and the defendant replied that he had none. (T. 54, 1. 
24-25. ) 
4. When Officer Guest asked the defendant his last 
name, the defendant looked around, paused, and said, 
"Jones". When asked his first name, he paused and said, 
"Paul". When asked his middle name, he paused and said, 
3 
"Arthur". When asked his date of birth, the officer 
recalled the defendant's response as 7-20-1950. (T. 55, 1. 
On cross-examination, defendant subsequently admitted the 
red light violation. (T. 91.) 
3 
The defendant maintained in his testimony and brief that 
his response was "John Paul Jones". This self-serving 
recitation of the "facts" is not properly before this Court 
in light of the jury verdict of guilty. Snyderville 
Transport Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 
1980). 
4 
The defendant's booking sheet shows a DOB of 8-2-48. (R. 
1.) 
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5. Officer Guest asked the defendant for a social 
security number and the defendant responded with a 278 
prefix. The Officer had never heard of such a number and 
inquired where the defendant was living when this number was 
issued. Then the defendant "got all upset" and said he was 
taking the Fifth Amendment. Officer Guest stated " . . . you 
have committed a traffic violation, and I'm going to give 
you a ticket for it, I have to know who you are." (T. 55, 
1. 21. ) 
6. Because the defendant was "very upset", Officer 
Guest called for a backup. Officer Cribbs arrived and 
defendant continued in falsely identifying himself as 
"Jones" (T. 55.) for a period of five minutes. (T. 64, 1. 
21. ) 
7. When the defendant was frisked for officer 
protection, a video store card was found in his pocket with 
the name Artis Bulla. (The defendant has never challenged 
the validity of the pat-down search which produced the video 
card. ) 
8. When asked if his name was Artis Bulla, the 
defendant responded yes and explained, " . . . well, I have 
several warrants out for my arrest, and I didn't want you to 
know who I was." Officer Guest verified that two warrants 
were outstanding. Guest then arrested the defendant for 
running the red light, giving false information to a police 
officer and the two outstanding warrants. (T. 55-56.) 
-5-
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9. The defendant admitted at trial to using a false 
name and also to making up a phony Social Security number. 
(T. 90.) 
10. Upon the City's close of its case in chief, the 
defendant moved to dismiss based on an alleged violation of 
his Fifth Amendment rights. (T. 76-82.) This motion was 
denied by the court. Based on the evidence the Court ruled 
that the defendant was not in a custodial interrogation 
situation, or a post-arrest situation and was therefore not 
required to have been given his Miranda rights prior to 
making his false statements. (T. 83.) The defendant argued 
his Fifth Amendment privilege to the jury in his closing 
statement. (T. 107-110.) 
11. At no point did the defendant object to the 
instruction which he now raises before the Court of Appeals. 
(R. 18-32, Instruction 2.) 
12. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on the charges of running the red light 
and of providing false information to a police officer. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(1) The Fifth Amendment "Miranda" rights against self-
incrimination which defendant relies on are inapposite given 
the facts of this case. Miranda dealt with a post-arrest, 
station house interrogation over a substantial period of 
time. The case before this Court deals with the brief stop 
of an observed traffic violator with the questioning 
-6-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
incident thereto specifically authorized by statute and case 
law. 
(2) There was no error committed by the Court 
concerning the credibility of the witnesses. Nor were there 
any procedural errors on the part of the trial court 
preserved for this appeal. The Instruction questioned on 




DEFENDANT FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HIS 
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION WAS 
VIOLATED BY A POLICE OFFICER'S 
INVESTIGATION INCIDENT TO A TRAFFIC 
STOP. 
This case is couched by the defendant in terms of a 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the 
1956 Miranda case requiring custodial interrogation 
warnings. He suggests that, at the point when he was 
stopped after having been observed running a red light, he 
was under arrest, therefore Miranda warnings were required 
and since they were not given, none of his subsequent false 
statements (and the basis for his conviction) were 
admissible. 
A. THE POLICE OFFICER'S STOP OF THE 
DEFENDANT FOR A CRIME COMMITTED IN 
HIS PLAIN VIEW WAS APPROPRIATE. 
Neither statute nor case law support the defendantf s 
contention. Section 77-7-15, U.C.A., specifies that a peace 
-7-
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officer may stop a person in a public place when the officer 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe the person has 
committed or is committing a crime. Clearly defendant Bulla 
was committing the red light violation in plain sight of 
Officer Guest. Section 77-7-15 goes on to give the peace 
officer the right to demand the person's "name, address and 
an explanation of his action." 
No Utah case has been found challenging this statute 
and similar statutes in other jurisdictions have not only 
been upheld but have been considered a right extended to the 
police under the common law. See, United States v. Thomas, 
250 F.Supp. 771 (1966). 
Further, 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a 
policeman who lacks the precise level of 
information necessary for probable cause to 
arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and 
allow a crime to occur or a criminal to 
escape. On the contrary, [Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 (1968)] recognizes that it may be the 
essence of good police work to adopt an 
intermediate response . . . . A brief stop 
of a suspicious individual, in order to 
determine his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light 
of the facts known to the officer at the 
time. 
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972). (Emphasis 
added.) 
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B. THE NON-CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION DID 
NOT REQUIRE A MIRANDA WARNING. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clarified the standards for 
determining whether interrogation is custodial or 
investigatory for purposes of the Miranda warning in Salt 
Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (1983). The Court 
held that factors to be considered in making that 
determination are: 
1. The site of interrogation; 
2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused; 
3. Whether objective indicia of arrest were present, 
and; 
4. The length and form of interrogation. 
The issue in earner involved field sobriety tests for 
suspected drunk drivers. The Court applied the four factor 
test and found that administering the tests was 
investigatory and not custodial. Miranda warnings were 
therefore not required: 
. . . Applying that test to the instant case, 
the field sobriety tests were requested and 
taken on a public street. Moreover, no 
indicia of arrest such as readied handcuffs, 
locked doors or drawn guns were present when 
the officer asked the defendant to perform 
the field sobriety tests. Also, the length 
of the performance of the tests was only 
minutes, a relatively short period of time. 
These factors do not suggest a custodial 
setting. The environment may have been 
authoritative but it certainly was not 
coercive or compelling. It is true that the 
investigation had focused on the accused. 
However, that was true at the point of 
initial observation; and, no one would argue 
-9-
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that a Miranda warning was obligatory at that 
point. 
Carner, supra, at 1171. 
This subject has been further addressed and clarified 
by the Utah Supreme Court in stating that there are three 
levels of police-citizen encounters: 
(1) [A]n officer may approach a citizen at 
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as 
the citizen is not detained against his will; 
(2) an officer may seize a person if the 
officer has an "articulable suspicion" that 
the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however the "detention must 
be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
stop;" (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if 
the officer has probable cause to believe an 
offense has been committed or is being 
committed. 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (quoting 
United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)) 
(citation omitted). This Court reiterated quoted these 
cases in the recent case of State v. Baird, 94 Utah Ad. Rep. 
40 (Nov. 1988). 
There is no question but that the public offense by the 
defendant committed in plan view of the officer caused a 
focus on the defendant. However, the conversation between 
Officer Guest and defendant Bulla, was as in earner, 
conducted on the public street; likewise, there were no 
handcuffs, locked doors or drawn guns; similarly Officer 
Guest at one point indicated the defendant's repeated 
representations of himself as "Jones" lasted for about five 
minute. 
-10-
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Based on these factors the trial judge's express 
determination that this was a non-custodial stop is clearly 
correct and Miranda warnings were not required, (T. 84.) 
It was not by any coercion by the officers, as the 
defendant would like to portray it, but rather the 
defendant's own choices which warranted the further 
investigation and constituted the separate violation of 
false information. 
Further, the defendant could have chosen to remain 
silent and avoided entirely the false information charge and 
conviction. (See, United States v. Bonanno, 180 F.Supp. 71, 
86 n. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1960): 
It must be borne in mind that the defendants 
in this case had a constitutional right to 
remain silent when questioned by police or 
other investigatory agents or bodies, but 
they chose not to do so. Had they chosen 
such a course, they would have suffered no 
penalty. 
POINT II 
THERE WERE NO PROCEDURAL ERRORS AT TRIAL 
REQUIRING REVERSAL. 
The defendant's second area of concern alleges various 
irrelevant, theologically-based references as errors 
requiring this Court to set aside the jury's findings of 
guilt. The defendant also raises for the first time on this 
appeal, an objection to the following jury instruction: 
It is the duty of the court to instruct you 
in the law that applies to this case, and it 
is your duty as jurors to follow the law as 
the court states it to you, regardless of 
-11-
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what you personally believe the law is or 
ought to be. On the other hand, it is your 
exclusive province to determine the facts in 
this case, and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose. 
(R. 18-32, Instruction #2) 
The defendant did not object to this instruction prior 
to the jury being instructed as required under Rule 19, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the ground of his 
objection. 
Although this pro se defendant was graciously allowed 
many indulgences by the trial court, he is bound by the same 
procedural rules as is the City on appeal. 
It is elementary that when a party does not 
raise objections below when he had notice and 
opportunity to object, he may not be heard to 
complain for the first time on appeal. We 
hold, therefore, that defendant waived all of 
these defects, if any there were, by failing 
to object below and we shall not further 
consider them. 
Huber v. Newman, 145 P.2d 780, 783. The instruction 
objection should appropriately be dismissed as waived. 
Waiver, however, may not apply if the instruction works 
a manifest injustice: 
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, 
error may be assigned to instructions in 
order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(Rule 19(c) U.R.C.P.) 
-12-
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Even if the objection to the instruction was not waived 
the instruction was appropriate. Case law supports the 
instruction, "Determination of facts is left exclusively to 
the jury." Lemmon v. Denver and R.G.W.R.Co., 341 P.2d 215 
(1944). 
The defendant's argument seems to read the instruction 
as requiring the jurors to come to a conclusion which was 
illegal. This is not a correct reading of the instruction. 
The challenged instruction is merely the standard, or 
"stock", instruction routinely given by trial courts in 
accordance with subsection (d) of Rule 19 U.R.C.P. which 
specifies the jury as the exclusive trier of fact (and by 
corollary the court as the determinor of the applicable 
law): 
(d) The court shall not comment on the 
evidence in the case, and if the court refers 
to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the 
jury that they are the exclusive judges of 
all questions of fact. 
CONCLUSION 
This issue on this appeal is not about Fifth Amendment 
rights and Miranda warnings. Neither came into play because 
the interrogation was non-custodial. The officer had a 
statutory right and duty to stop and question the defendant 
as he did for a violation the officer personally observed. 
The defendant made his own choice to speak falsely and 
compounded his problem. Now he seeks to dress his behavior 
in the armor of constitutional protection and avoid 
responsibility for lying. 
-13-
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That failing, the defendant then (untimely) seeks to 
blame the judge, jury and trial procedures for his 
conviction. The stock instruction was appropriate and guilt 
was adequately established by the witnesses. 
The defendant's appeal should be dismissed in its 
entirety. 
7 IS+ 
Respectfully submitted this ^( day of November, 
1988. CV^Ky, yj 
tfUL^g* 
DONALD L. GEORGE 
Assistant City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Salt Lake City 
DGrcc 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ySu/' 
I hereby certify that I mailed rwe-copies of the 
foregoing Brief to Artis Brent Bulla, 349 West 300 South, 
Provo, Utah 84601, by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, 
postage prepaid, this 21st day of November, 1988. 
^1A 
^ V ? 
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